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Abstract: Platforms operators act as private regulators to increase usage and maximize profits. Their 
goals depend on the development of the platform: overcoming the chicken-egg problem early on 
requires attracting platform participants while quality becomes more important later on. Private 
regulators influence third-party business models, entry barriers, and usage intensity. We analyze 
how drivers of usage intensity on Facebook’s application platform were affected by a policy change 
that increased quality incentives for applications. This change led to the number of installations of 
each application becoming less important, applications in more concentrated sub-markets achieving 
higher usage, and applications staying attractive for longer. 
 
Keywords: private regulation, multi-sided platforms, usage intensity 
JEL Classification: L1, L50, O33 
  
1 
 
1. Introduction 
A platform sponsor has to manage multiple sides of a platform (or multi-sided market) 
simultaneously. Consumers will only use the platform if there are sufficient complementary goods 
available, while producers of complementary goods will only provide them if the number of 
potential users is sufficiently large. In other words, platform markets frequently display indirect 
network effects (Farrell and Klemperer 2007). To ensure a sufficient variety of complementary 
goods, platform providers often open up their platform to third-party developers who supply 
additional modules and functionality (Wheelwright and Clark 1992). Opening one side of the market 
poses challenges to the platform owner as its ability to generate revenues and profits depends on 
the quality and quantity of both market sides, none of which the owner controls directly. 
Managing incentives for both sides is comparable to the problem of a regulator maximizing overall 
welfare – the sum of utilities of consumers and platform developers. Observers of platform markets 
therefore frequently denote the management of a platform “private platform regulation” (Boudreau 
2008, Boudreau and Hagiu 2009, Hagiu 2009). As many platforms monetize platform usage by way of 
advertising or transaction-based charges, effectively managing usage intensity or frequency is often 
at the core of platform regulation. This is often done through non-price instruments imposing rules 
and constraints, creating inducements and shaping demand and supply behavior (Boudreau and 
Hagiu 2009). 
Multi-sided platforms face a chicken-egg-problem (Caillaud and Jullien 2003, Evans 2003) as each 
side of the platform only becomes attractive for potential participants if there are enough 
participants on the other side. The key goal of a platform operator in the early stages therefore is to 
attract a sufficient number of participants. Once a critical mass of users has been reached on both 
sides of the platform however, goals change as retaining existing adopters becomes more important 
than attracting new ones. If existing adopters value quality on the other platform side, increasing 
quality becomes the key goal. Therefore, the quality/quantity tradeoff introduced by Hagiu (2009) 
changes along the lifecycle of multi-sided platforms: quantity matters more in the startup phase 
while quality matters more for established platforms. 
In this paper, we examine the policies used by the social networking site Facebook, one of the most 
successful recent platforms, and its effects on usage intensity, which is a useful indicator for the 
commercial potential of a platform. In a significant shift in incentives for application developers (i.e. 
participants on one market side), Facebook attempted to increase the average quality of 
applications and thereby maintain high user involvement and activity. 
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We study applications developed for Facebook and observe their usage between September 2007 
and June 2008.1 This captures both the startup and mature phases of the platform. On Facebook, the 
amount of information an application can send out to users critically influences usage intensity and 
thus monetization opportunities. In February 2008, Facebook implemented a radical policy change 
regarding the amount of notifications applications could send out: before February 2008, all 
applications could send out the same amount of messages, while thereafter, the amount of 
notifications permitted was determined by how frequently the notifications were clicked on, which 
proxies for application quality. Facebook thus increased incentives for producing high-quality 
applications and punished applications that send out information considered useless by users. 
We use this policy change (assumed to be endogenous to the platform operator but exogenous for 
application developers) to analyze how drivers of usage intensity changed following the policy 
change. We analyze a set of economic determinants that may drive usage intensity. First, we 
consider network effects from the installed base of an application’s users and from portfolio effects 
from sister applications by the same developer. Second, we analyze if and how application age 
influences usage intensity. Finally, we study if the degree of concentration in an application’s 
submarket affects usage. In addition to estimating the time-invariant effects, we allow these drivers 
to have different effects over different stages of the diffusion process. 
We use a rich, longitudinal data set on 18,552 applications on the social networking site Facebook. 
The empirical setting is favorable for several reasons. First, we have data on applications soon after 
the launch of the platform, which lets us examine the dynamics of a nascent and dynamic market. 
Second, we have a complete listing of applications on the platform, avoiding selection and survivor 
biases. Third, Facebook’s platform is one of the largest and most successful platforms for 
applications. Its approach to managing a platform is widely considered and copied in the industry. 
We estimate fixed-effect OLS models and analyze the overall effects on an application’s usage 
intensity before disentangling how they are affected by the policy change and diffusion stage. We 
find that the policy change led to quantity (as expressed by the number of installations of each 
application) becoming less important, in line with expectations. Further, we find that applications in 
more concentrated sub-markets generate higher usage after the policy change, suggesting a move 
towards winner-takes-all outcomes in such submarkets. Finally, although usage intensity always 
declines as applications become older, the decline becomes less severe after the policy change, 
which suggests that the policy change was successful in keeping adopters more active over time. 
                                                            
1 The application platform was opened in May 2007. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we introduce the role of Facebook as a private 
regulator. Section 3 describes a set of economic conditions that are likely to determine usage 
intensity. The data source, variables as well as illustrative examples are presented in section 4. In 
section 5, we specify our empirical model and discuss the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Facebook as a private regulator 
In the following, we discuss the ongoing interventions by Facebook, operator of the world’s biggest 
online social network. Access restrictions, rules and dynamics of the platform and particularly the 
market for applications are managed by Facebook with the aim of optimizing its benefit. Facebook’s 
interventions, however, differ from the more common price-setting regulations set by platform 
operators (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005, Rochet and Tirole 2006). Only recently, research has begun 
to consider regulatory tactics beyond price-setting such as imposing rules and constraints, creating 
incentives and otherwise shaping behavior (Boudreau and Hagiu 2009). Facebook has a set of 
regulative instruments with which it directly and indirectly influences the number and quality of 
available applications. On the one hand, Facebook can make decisions on the technology of the 
programming platform or the design of the user interface. On the other hand, it requires developers 
and users to comply with legal terms and conditions that regulate the extent to which developers 
can use the technological platform and how they can market their application. 
Facebook is a major player in social networking websites (other examples are Orkut, LinkedIn, or 
MySpace). Consumers use social networking services to interact with friends, family members, and 
increasingly business partners. Core components include personal mini-homepages with which a 
user creates a digital representation of him-/herself (Boyd and Ellison 2007), different means to 
communicate (personal messages, boards, chats) and to exchange different media.2 Facebook is the 
largest and fastest-growing social network with over 400 million active users of which 70% are 
outside the U.S. (as of February 2010).3 
Facebook has been actively managing their platform from the start. In May 2007, Facebook launched 
a platform consisting of a set of programming tools and standards as well as the opportunity for 
third-party developers to extract revenue from usage of their applications. In May 2008, one year 
after the platform launched, more than 30,000 applications had been developed. Those applications 
attracted more than 900 million installations in total (90% of all users had installed at least one 
application). This large variety of applications has important consequences for consumers’ product 
search and adoption. On Facebook, adoption and usage takes place in a strongly embedded social 
                                                            
2 Facebook is the largest online photo sharing utility. 
3 Source: http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics. 
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context. The functionality provided by the platform operator lets developers build applications 
which are designed to intensify social interactions (Boudreau and Hagiu 2009). Thus, application 
discovery and adoption is highly influenced by a user’s social context. Users are passively influenced 
through the visibility of usage patterns in the network through reviews, ratings or matching 
mechanisms (Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan 2006, Hervas-Drane 2010). Active forms of social 
influence take the form of recommendations which are directly conveyed via predominantly digital 
or online word-of-mouth processes (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955). Marketing scholars have examined 
the conditions under which consumers are likely to rely on others’ opinions in their purchase 
decisions, the motives for people to spread the word about a product, and the variation in strength 
of influence people have on their peers in word-of-mouth communications (Dellarocas 2003, Phelps 
et al. 2005). It is widely acknowledged that in such contexts bandwagon processes – positive 
feedback loops where adoption decisions by some increase the incentive or pressure to adopt for 
others – are common (Katz and Shapiro 1985, Katz and Shapiro 1986, Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 
1993).4 
We now discuss three dimensions of regulation important for platform operators: monetization, 
application entry, and usage. 
2.1. Regulating monetization opportunities 
When Facebook launched its platform for third-parties in May 2007, developers may have been 
primarily intrigued by the opportunities to integrate their applications in Facebook’s service. 
However, there was also a clear economic opportunity. Facebook announced that it would allow 
“mass distribution” and create “new opportunity … to build a business”.5  
Facebook’s objectives are largely aligned with their third-party developers’ and is based on 
capitalizing on its active user base. Revenues are realized via selling advertising space to brands, 
advertisers or Facebook applications who target specific users. Facebook has also experimented with 
"Engagement Ads" that not only display brand messages but allow users to interact with a brand 
through gift-giving, commenting and promotion. Next to each application’s canvas page (the space 
allocated to an application), Facebook can place its own advertising. As a consequence, the more 
users engage with applications, the more page impressions or time Facebook is able to sell to 
advertisers. Another strategy is to keep a revenue share of transactions that take place on the 
                                                            
4 Another feature relates to the costs that users incur in installing and using applications. Due to the dominant 
business model of indirect monetization, the vast majority of applications are free to use. Also, due to 
technical and design features, users can install and use multiple applications in parallel, thus “multi-home” 
(Rochet and Tirole 2003). 
5 See release: http://developers.facebook.com/news.php?blog=1&story=21 
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platform or by re-directing users to shopping sites (e.g. a music application may forward interested 
users to the iTunes service where copyrighted music can be purchased). In the future, Facebook will 
launch its own payment system "Facebook Credits" comparable to PayPal. This will allow Facebook 
to directly benefit from purchases that go through its system (with a revenue split of about 30%).  
Consequently, the level of revenue that can be realized is directly determined by the number of 
active users of the platform and applications. Thus, growing the platform (applications) and keeping 
existing users active (and therefore generating transactions or looking at and clicking on ads) is 
among their most important objectives. 
Facebook left it open to developers how to monetize their application pages through advertising or 
other transactions that they control themselves. Facebook deliberately did not impose restrictions 
on the form of advertising. The most common form are advertisements next to the website’s 
content and core functionality. The placement is determined by the fit between the (micro-)site’s 
content and the advertiser’s message as well as competitive bidding between advertisers (Evans 
2008). Similar to Facebook itself, applications can also keep a share of revenues generated by on-site 
transactions (e.g. online games can offer additional functionality for a premium fee) or by 
transactions referred to external sites. As an important strategic decision, Facebook decided not to 
take a share of transaction sales initially, leaving developers to capitalize on this revenue stream.6  
2.2. Regulating application entry 
As in most markets with indirect network effects, platform operators want to encourage a wide 
variety of applications and experimentation in parallel (Church and Gandal 2000, Boudreau et al. 
2008). Consequently, they provide developers with a set of tools that decrease their development 
costs and thus entry barriers. Low barriers to entry lead to high rates of entry, both from new 
entrants as well as from developers with multiple applications. This affects both the users and the 
developers’ incentives. On the one hand, a large variety of applications presents novel challenges for 
consumers to discover and adopt applications (Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan 2006, Hervas-
Drane 2010). On the other hand, high rates of entry could result in particularly high levels of 
competition which again would diminish profits and incentives around the platform (Boudreau 
2008). 
Facebook wanted to facilitate entry of as many developers as possible. The company offered 
strategic subsidies to third-party developers (Shapiro and Varian 1998) by providing open and well-
                                                            
6 Due to the (open) installation process and the lack of a payment system, Facebook could not take a revenue 
cut from developers without further development. In contrast, Apple takes a 30% revenue share from all sales 
in its iTunes store. 
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documented application programming interfaces, multiple development languages, free test 
facilities, as well as support for developers through developer forums and conferences. Facebook 
also has minimal requirements for applications to be included in the official directory and it does not 
“police” developers imitating or producing “copy-cats” of existing applications. 
2.3. Regulating application diffusion and usage 
The primary objective of a social networking service is to grow and activate its user base. We 
therefore focus on the regulatory activities relating to Facebook’s rules of how applications are 
visible within the social networking service and therefore affect its user base.  
Users adopt applications through two main channels. First, users of an application can directly invite 
friends who are not currently users of the application (invites). Second, Facebook users get regular 
updates on friends’ activities from the built-in “News Feed”. To some extent, applications can send 
messages to this news feed and signal a friend’s activity in this particular application (notifications). 
Both channels are regulated heavily by Facebook. In the first phase, from launch in May to August 
2007, invites and notifications could be sent almost without restrictions. Application developers 
used this to “spam” many of their users’ friends. In September 2007, the start of our study period, 
Facebook imposed a set of restrictions (the number of invites and notifications by user was limited). 
In the following months the rules remained unchanged.7 
However, after months of steady growth, Facebook made a series of announcements that changed 
significantly how developers could activate both channels. On January 1st, 2008, Facebook 
announced that there would be changes in the near future. On February 6th, 2008 a major 
announcement followed that specified that the rules would be changed such that notifications and 
invites would be allocated based on user feedback. Applications whose users react more heavily to 
notifications/invites that are sent out (a measure for relevance of the notifications/invites), would be 
able to send out more notifications/invites. One week later, feedback allocation was launched for 
notifications, requests, and invites. These changes implied that applications that send out more 
successful notifications and invites could utilize the two channels more actively, leading to a 
reinforcing loop that favors applications that are used more actively already. 
What motivated Facebook to initiate these changes? And how did it affect developers? In the early 
phases of a platform such as Facebook’s market for applications, the platform operator (or 
regulator) wants to attract entry by application developers. This is done by lowering the costs 
developers incur when learning the “language” of the new platform. Further, it relates to the costs 
                                                            
7 To the best of our knowledge based on the official announcements of Facebook to its developers. 
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of marketing a novel application and ensuring its diffusion. Hence, Facebook was interested in 
providing developers with easy access to the option space and awareness of its user base. This was 
done by allowing developers to send out many notifications and invites. Highly publicized success 
stories created a gold rush among developers, e.g. the music application iLike grew to several million 
users within days. Within weeks, several thousand application developers had signed up for access 
credentials to the platform and had started to launch a wide variety of applications. Besides 
providing specific incentives for developers, Facebook also wanted to “educate” users about the 
option to install add-on applications to make the service fresh and exciting. Users learned quickly. 
Through invites and a flood of notifications in their news feed, the vast majority of users had 
installed at least one application within weeks. Also, many users installed dozens of applications at 
the same time (multi-homing is comparatively costless here), sometimes even several with largely 
identical functionality (e.g. within the first month there were several enhanced “Walls” that allowed 
posting and exchanging multi-media items).  
After the initial enthusiasm, however, the sentiment among users towards applications changed. 
With the rapid increase of the installed base of applications and the increasing professionalization of 
developers in terms of exploiting the opportunities to use the “viral channels”, the volume of 
notifications and invites grew exponentially. Users were increasingly annoyed by constant updates 
about their friend’s activities and applications. For both Facebook as the platform operator and the 
developers this would eventually lead to adverse effects. Instead of inducing additional application 
adoption and usage, users would start ignoring and delete notifications and requests. 
In response to this, Facebook introduced the regulatory changes described above. Its objective 
changed from trying to ensure rapid diffusion of applications towards emphasizing application 
quality and notifications that would induce usage intensity for established applications. While this 
objective may be aligned to the developers of mature and established applications, it may have 
adverse effects on the incentives of new entrants or developers of smaller applications. 
We disentangle the impact of Facebook’s private regulatory change on the usage intensity of 
applications. The following section identifies possible drivers of usage intensity. 
3. Determinants of application usage intensity 
Following the description of the main economic characteristics of Facebook’s application platform, 
we now derive factors that may influence usage intensity of individual applications. We distinguish 
between effects caused by externalities such as an application’s installed base as well as effects 
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across applications within a developer’s portfolio. We also consider application age, concentration of 
sub-markets, and update activity. 
3.1. Within-application externalities: installed base effects 
The installed base of users of an application can relate to usage intensity through network effects as 
well as through implications of different diffusion models.  
If there are network effects at the application level, we expect a positive effect of installed base on 
usage intensity. However, if network effects only exist on a local level, i.e. an application becomes 
more attractive the more friends of a user have installed it, we do not expect to observe a positive 
effect of an application’s (global) installed base on usage intensity. 
The second mechanism that drives average usage intensity through the installed base can be derived 
from two of the most common diffusion theories (Grajek and Kretschmer 2009), namely the 
epidemic model of diffusion and the probit diffusion model (Geroski 2000). Both of these models 
have different predictions on how usage intensity changes along the diffusion process and a growing 
installed base (Cabral 2006). If diffusion takes place among heterogeneous adopters, late adopters 
have lower utility than early adopters under reasonable assumptions. Therefore, usage intensity is 
expected to decline with a growing installed base. Conversely, the epidemic model assumes identical 
preferences and users gain knowledge about a new technology at different points in time through an 
epidemic process. So, if an epidemic process drives diffusion, we do not expect to observe a positive 
effect of an application’s installed base on usage intensity. 
As network effects and the different diffusion models have conflicting implications regarding how 
the installed base of an application determines usage intensity, we cannot disentangle the two but 
can compare their relative strength by observing the net effect (Grajek and Kretschmer 2009).  
3.2. Within-portfolio externalities: effects across applications 
The next determinant we analyze is in how far the portfolio of a firm’s applications affects an 
application’s usage intensity. As entry barriers are low, one developer or one firm can easily offer 
multiple Facebook applications. We consider how the number of installations from sister 
applications as well as the number of sister applications itself could influence usage intensity. 
Regarding the number of users that have installed sister applications, we can argue similarly as for 
the number of users of the focal application. One the one hand, the larger an application provider is 
in terms of installations, the higher the chances to attract resources that can be used for usage-
increasing activities. Larger firms will find it easier to obtain external equity financing, which in turn 
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can be used to improve applications and to increase advertising spending, both potentially leading to 
increased usage. Further, the firm can directly monetize their consumers with advertising revenues, 
which allows them spending money on the same usage-increasing activities as discussed above. 
Finally, firms can build direct cross-links between applications, leading to usage spillovers. On the 
other hand, large installation number can again proxy overall consumer heterogeneity, which would 
let us expect lower usage. Again, we can only observe the net effect. 
The second way to proxy for a firm’s resources is by the number of applications. Here, we expect 
more negative usage implications than from the sister applications’ number of registered users. If a 
firm has a lower number of applications (controlling for the number of users of these applications), 
we expect the firm to be better able to focus on actively managing these few applications and 
therefore achieving higher usage intensity. Further, if a firm has a less applications, user awareness 
is divided over fewer applications, there is less self-cannibalization, and usage intensity increases. 
3.3. Application age 
Application age, i.e. the time since which the application has been launched, may also drive usage 
intensity. As applications become older, the developer can remove bugs from the application, react 
to user feedback, and implement new features. This suggests that older applications have higher 
quality and if users value this, usage intensity will go up. However, older applications may be used 
less intensively if usage follows a fad, i.e. users are only interested in the application for a short time.   
3.4. Concentration of sub-markets 
Applications on Facebook’s application platform have no direct consumption costs (prices are zero). 
However, usage of an application comes at an opportunity cost as time could have also been spent 
on activities outside Facebook or on other applications.  
Therefore, if several similarly sized applications are active in the relevant market segment of an 
application (i.e. concentration is low), users have more alternatives to choose from, incur higher 
opportunity costs of using this application and will therefore use each application less. They may 
even multi-home and spread their usage over several applications. Further, in less concentrated 
markets, a user’s friends will probably be also distributed on different applications so that local 
network effects will be lower. 
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3.5. Update activity 
Update activity can actively be influenced by the application developers. Facebook applications 
usually have quite a narrow scope of functionality. As argued, an application can become less 
attractive for each individual (who has already installed the application) over time. However, user 
interest can be retained if an application is regularly updated and improved. Updating an application 
could include adding new features, new content, or just changing the application’s appearance. 
Applications that are actively managed and updated regularly should therefore be able to retain 
their customers more effectively and achieve higher usage intensity. 
4. Data 
This paper analyzes a unique dataset collected by the authors. Data comes from Facebook’s public 
directory of applications which includes all applications available on the Facebook platform.8 These 
applications have “About”-pages which were downloaded and relevant data extracted.  
We utilize weekly data from the period of September 1, 2007 to June 30, 2008.9 This period was 
characterized by strong growth in terms of users of Facebook’s service and the number of 
applications and their users on the platform. Facebook’s active user base grew from 15 million to 
just over 30 million in this period (see Figure 1). The number of applications on the platform grew 
immensely from around 2,000 in the beginning of September 2007 to over 18,000 in early 2008. The 
number of active users of these applications increased at a significantly lower but still substantial 
pace. From September to December the number doubled (15 to 35 million daily active users). The 
total of application users peaked shortly before Christmas 2007. During Christmas break, usage was 
lower and decreased further as Facebook’s changes to the platform took effect. Despite further 
growth in the number of applications, the total usage of these stabilized at 30 million active users a 
day, below the previous peak (Figure 2). 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
                                                            
8 Accessible at http://www.facebook.com/applications/. See Figure B. 1 for an example of an application page 
in the directory. 
9 Note that Facebook’s platform for applications was launched on May 24, 2007. We exclude the first three 
months of data from our analysis because of one main reason. Facebook did not report usage statistics with 
regard to active users and percent active usage until August 28, 2007. Before that date, the success metric was 
the number of users measured by number of installations.  
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------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
We obtained records for 18,552 applications. The records include data on an application’s entry to 
the platform, its usage by Facebook members, its developer and finally an assignment to certain 
categories. Further, we computed a number of measures by observing changes made to the 
directory page as well as from clustering applications by developer name. 
Our data is particularly suitable for the analysis of usage intensity for several reasons. First, we have 
precise measures for usage and usage intensity. Facebook reports continuously how many users 
have interacted with the application within the previous 24 hours. It also specifies the percentage of 
all users, i.e. the ratio of active users (last 24 hours) to all users who have installed the application in 
the same time period. Consequently, we observe both the (active) installed base of an application 
and the intensity with which it is used. Second, the measures of usage directly indicate the potential 
for economic success. Third, our data mitigates selection problems originating from deterred entry 
and observed survival. Developer entry to the platform is frequent due to low entry barriers. More 
importantly, however, costs of entry can be assumed to be homogeneous. Finally, the dataset 
includes applications that were successful and applications that did not reach a meaningful user 
base. Since data is recorded from the first day an application appears in the directory, information is 
available independent of the application’s following success. This is rather unique particularly for 
studies on Internet-based industries. Here, determining entry accurately is usually difficult due to 
poor documentation of the early history of a category or firm. Published accounts on the entities 
often do not appear before they reach a “threshold scale” (Eisenmann 2006, p. 1193). 
4.1. Variables 
The variables are described in Table 1 and Table 2 reports summary statistics. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
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Dependent variable (𝑼𝒔𝒂𝒈𝒆𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕). Our dependent variable (𝑼𝒔𝒂𝒈𝒆𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕) is an 
application i’s usage intensity in week t measured as the average percentage of daily active users. 
This means we observe the percentage of an application’s installed base of users that uses the 
application on a given day and form the weekly average. All of the following time-dependent 
variables are also observed on a daily basis and then aggregated up to the weekly level. 10 For most 
regressions, we use the logarithm of (𝑼𝒔𝒂𝒈𝒆𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕). 11 
Regulation  𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒚𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒕 . As discussed in section 2.3, Facebook changed the rules in how far 
applications can send out notifications in February 2008. We therefore construct a dummy variable 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡  which takes a value of zero before the change (until the sixth week of 2008) and a 
value of one thereafter. 
Number of users  (𝑵𝒖𝒎𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒕). On an application level, we observe the number of Facebook 
users that have installed an application on their profile page (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ). 
Firm resources (𝑵𝒖𝒎𝑺𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒔𝒊𝒕, 𝑵𝒖𝒎𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔𝑺𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒔𝒊𝒕). As developers can release 
several applications, we measure a firm’s resources in the form of sister applications. While 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  is the number of an application i’s sister applications at time t, 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  is the cumulated number of users that have installed sister applications. 
Application age  𝑾𝒆𝒆𝒌𝒔𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊𝒕 . We measure the age of the application (𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 ) by 
counting the weeks since the application has appeared in the application directory for the first time. 
Market concentration (𝑯𝑯𝑰𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒕, 𝑯𝑯𝑰𝒄𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒕). We construct two measures of market 
concentration to define the relevant market for the application broadly or narrowly. When 
application developers register their application in the Facebook application directory, they can 
assign their application to two categories from a choice of 22 possible categories. Therefore, a broad 
market definition is to define the competitive field as all active applications in one of the two 
registered categories, while a narrow definition includes only the applications registered for the 
same two categories. We measure concentration by the Herfindahl Hirshman Index (HHI). 
Product updates  𝑼𝒑𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝑭𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒊𝒕 . We observe several variables that indicate an update of the 
underlying application: we check if the name or one of the descriptive elements of an application 
has changed, if the screenshot was updated, and if the category of the application has changed. For 
                                                            
10 We aggregate data from a daily to a weekly level to average out weekday-dependent differences in usage 
intensity. 
11 We do this as the distribution of 𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  is skewed, as can be observed in Figure B. 2 and Figure 
B. 3. 
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each observed point in time, we calculate an application’s update intensity 𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡  as the 
cumulative number of updates divided by the age of the application (𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 ). 
Diffusion stage (𝑫𝒊𝒇𝒇𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊𝒕). We construct an indicator for the diffusion stage, which takes on a 
value of zero before an application reaches the inflection point of the diffusion process (discussed in 
section 4.3) and a value of one thereafter. 
Season  𝑪𝒉𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒂𝒔𝒕 . Finally, we construct a dummy for the holiday season to account for 
changed usage behavior during this time of year. We set 𝐶𝑕𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡  to one for the last two weeks 
of 2007 and for the first week of 2008, and zero for the remainder of our observation period. 
4.2. Examples 
The following gives an illustration of two key measures for our analysis: the number of users of an 
application (Figure 3) and the percent of daily active usage (Figure 4). The first describes how many 
users have installed an application. The second is the percentage of the number of all users who 
have installed the application who have been active within the last 24 hours. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
We chose the following three applications: Are You Interested? is a dating application that lets users 
rate others with regard to their perceived attractiveness. Users can also indicate if they want to get 
to know the other person. Entourage lets users display the profile pictures of selected friends on 
one’s own profile page. This enables a quick overview of one’s most important friends – useful for 
users who may have more than 1,000 “friends” on their list. Super Wall12 is an application that uses 
some of the core functionality of Facebook’s service (the “Wall”, a virtual blackboard) and extends it 
by letting users post pictures and videos. It also has features for interactive communication. 
Figure 3 plots the number of users for each application during the time of our analysis. One can 
clearly observe differences. Super Wall has been the most successful of the three applications in 
terms of overall installations, with a steadily increasing number of users. Are you interested? follows 
second with lower diffusion speed at around the half of the observation period. Finally, Entourage 
                                                            
12 Now re-branded to “RockYou Live”. 
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diffuses at the same speed as Are you interested? up to around half of the observation period and 
levels off thereafter and the application fells well behind Are you interested?. 13 
The second measure of interest in this study is the intensity to which applications are being used. 
Figure 4 plots that measure for the abovementioned applications. In all three graphs, usage intensity 
is rather low on average. Entourage is typical for many applications with modest network effects: 
the percentage of active users is steadily and rapidly decreasing. In the later stages of our study 
period, it approaches 1-2%. The picture is somewhat different for the other two, which are more 
likely to exhibit direct network effects. While Are You Interested? also declines rapidly at the 
beginning (from 28 to 6%), there is also a period in which daily active usage climbs again to over 
10%, and it stabilizes at around 6-7%. Super Wall, after weeks of steady increase (from 8 to 12%) 
there is a spike just before Christmas, where active usage climbs to over 20%, and it later declines 
again, also consolidating at around 6-7%. 
These examples show different patterns both in absolute and relative usage of applications. 
Anecdotally, we can also observe that applications more prone to exhibit direct network effects have 
different usage patterns than applications that do not: their growth path is steeper and their relative 
usage appears to be higher. 
4.3. Diffusion of individual applications 
As already observed in Figure 3, the diffusion of individual applications typically follows an S-shaped 
curve. As in Grajek and Kretschmer (2009) we fit a logistic diffusion model to capture the diffusion of 
individual applications: 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖
∗
1 + exp −𝛽 𝑡 − 𝜏  
 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖
∗ denotes the market potential of  application 𝑖, 𝛽 the diffusion speed, and 𝜏 the 
inflection point of the diffusion process, i.e. the point at which half of potential adopters 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖
∗ have installed the application. For our analysis, we focus especially on the inflection 
point 𝜏, as this allows us to differentiate between the stages of the diffusion process: the growth 
rate of 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡  increases before 𝜏 and decreases thereafter. We estimate the logistic diffusion 
model with NLS and use 𝜏 to construct the dummy variable 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 . 
                                                            
13 Note that all three applications can be classified as “success” since they were among the 50 most successful 
applications throughout the period of this study. The vast majority of applications do not attract nearly as 
many users. 
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Table 3 reports estimation results for the three example applications discussed above. Figure 3 also 
shows the fitted values for these three applications, which fit the actual values well. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
5. Empirical specification and results 
5.1. Usage regression 
We estimate usage intensity of application 𝑖 at time 𝑡 with the following baseline specification. 
𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽1𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠 + 𝛽6𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐶𝑕𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
We use fixed-effect OLS with cluster-robust standard errors. 
5.2. Results 
In the following, we first analyze the overall effects on usage intensity before disentangling in how 
far these effects are influenced by the and by the policy change and by the diffusion stage. Finally, 
we report results of our robustness checks. 
5.2.1 Overall results 
Our baseline model is reported in Table 4. The results reported here cover the entire observation 
period from September 2007 to June 2008. For this section we assume coefficients for the entire 
observation period to be constant. We later relax this assumption and allow the coefficients to 
change with Facebook’s policy change in February 2008 and the diffusion stage. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
First, we see that the number of application users (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 ) has a significantly negative impact 
on usage intensity. Following Cabral (2006) Grajek and Kretschmer (2009), this suggests that 
consumer heterogeneity dominates network effects as additional users imply a less keen user base. 
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Next, we observe usage-increasing effects of higher market concentration both at the category-level 
(𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 ) and the cross-category-level (𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 ). This is in line with our expectations that we 
find less multi-homing and higher local network effects in more concentrated markets, which leads 
to higher usage intensity. The fact that the coefficient of 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  is larger than the coefficient of 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  suggests that the appropriate market definition seems to be a single category. 
Regarding the sister applications we observe a significantly negative effect from the number of sister 
applications (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡 ) and from the aggregate number of users of all sister applications 
(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡 ). As a user’s attention will be split across different applications for higher 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡 , we can explain declining usage intensity for a growing number of sister 
applications. The negative influence of 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  indicates customer heterogeneity 
also at the portfolio level in addition to the already observed effect on application level. 
Finally, we see that an actively managed application with a high update frequency (𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡 ) 
can maintain higher usage intensity and that we see a significant decrease of usage intensity during 
the Christmas season. 
5.2.2 Influence of policy change and diffusion stage 
We now analyze in how far the policy change conducted by the platform operator Facebook as well 
as the diffusion stage of an application have an impact on usage intensity of individual applications. 
We therefore interact our usage drivers with 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡  and 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  and report the 
results in Table 5. The first column reports the main effects while the second and third column 
report the interaction terms with 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  and 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡 , respectively. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
Our first variable of interest is 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 . First, we see there is no significant main effect, i.e. 
network effects and customer heterogeneity seem to balance in the early stages of diffusion. 
However, as an application reaches an advanced diffusion stage, it is better able to profit from 
network effects. In contrast, the policy change more than offsets this usage-increasing effect. The 
negative coefficient in the baseline model is therefore driven primarily by the usage-decreasing 
effect from the policy change. 
We then analyze if the effect of market concentration as measured with 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  and 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  is 
affected by diffusion stage and policy change. We find that the positive effect in the baseline model 
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is driven by the diffusion stage and the policy change, suggesting that post-intervention and in the 
advanced diffusion stages, usage in concentrated markets is especially high, possibly suggesting 
winner-take-all outcomes.  
Next, we analyze effects from the portfolio of sister applications. Regarding the number of sister 
applications, 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡 , we see a negative main effect, which is reduced slightly by the 
policy change. Regarding the number of users of sister applications, 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡 , there 
are no significant effects for the main effect or the interaction with the diffusion stage. The negative 
baseline effect is therefore driven by the negative coefficient with the policy change interaction. 
We see that the positive effect from update activity is slightly increased for later stages of the 
diffusion process and slightly reduced after the policy change. Finally, applications that reached a 
later diffusion stage at Christmas 2007 suffer less from the usage-decreasing season effect. We have 
no interactions with the policy change, as the policy change happened after Christmas. 
5.2.3 Robustness Checks 
We check robustness of our results with a number of alternative regression models.  
First, we analyze if the interaction term coefficients reported in Table 5 are robust. Therefore, in 
Table A. 1, we report interactions with 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  and 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡  in independent 
regressions. In Table A. 2, we also allow for three-way interactions with 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  and 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡 . We see that our alternative regressions deliver the same consistent results. 
In a second set of robustness checks we report alternative regressions to the baseline regression 
reported in Table 4. In Table A. 3, we first rerun the results of the baseline model and compare them 
with an identical model in which all observations without any active users are dropped. We then add 
two more models (one including observations with inactive applications and one excluding them) 
with a linear instead of a logarithmic dependent variable. Finally, we report results for a fixed-effect 
Poisson model. Our results are largely confirmed with these robustness checks. The only noteworthy 
difference is the significantly positive coefficient for 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 in the Poisson regression. 
6. Conclusion 
We analyze drivers of usage intensity for Facebook applications, one of the most popular multi-sided 
platforms in today’s Internet business. We study the effect of measures capturing network effects, 
market concentration, and application age. Our findings suggest that customer heterogeneity 
dominates network effects, usage intensity declines over time, and that more concentrated sub-
markets have higher usage levels. We let the effects vary by the applications’ stage of the diffusion 
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process, and study if the usage drivers have changed significantly following a policy change 
undertaken by Facebook to increase the incentives to provide high-quality applications. Following 
the policy change, the effect of network size has decreased, while applications in advanced stages of 
their diffusion process have higher network effects, suggesting critical mass phenomena.  
Active regulation is important for establishing a successful multi-sided platform. In the early stages 
of a platform, platform owners maximize growth by allowing fast spread of applications via viral 
channels. Once the variety of applications in the market is sufficiently high, the platform provider’s 
goals change: instead of maximizing growth, policies are aimed at ensuring long-term customer 
retention. Facebook tried this by changing the way in which applications can use viral channels. This 
intervention led to applications staying attractive to customers for longer, but also fosters the 
emergence of concentrated market structures in the different application submarkets. 
With the increasing proliferation of the digitization of word-of-mouth processes (Dellarocas 2003), 
research on the impact of such mechanisms on market structure has intensified. There are two 
opposing lines of argument (Dellarocas and Narayan 2007): On the one hand, the opportunity for 
users to easily discuss and recommend even largely unknown products will shift demand towards 
the “long tail” of less popular products (Anderson 2006). The underlying hypothesis is that such 
forms of communication reduce the informational inequality between hit and niche products and 
helps other consumers discover products otherwise consigned to the “long tail”, resulting in less 
concentrated markets. On the other hand, it has been argued that other drivers, such as user-
generated rankings and the prevalence of prominently displayed statistics about other consumers’ 
actions (Duan et al. 2006, Tucker and Zhang 2007) will lead to bandwagon behavior, directing 
consumer attention to already popular products, a phenomenon referred to as the “superstar 
effect” (Rosen 1981). Indeed, Boudreau and Hagiu (2009) suggest that platform operators like 
Facebook regulate the market for applications such that winner-takes-all outcomes arise in niches to 
incentivize developers to contribute high quality applications. 
This paper contributes to the growing empirical literature on platform markets and their dynamics. A 
number of extensions would seem particularly promising. First, we can only impute the motives for 
the policy changes Facebook undertook. If indeed they were initiated to increase usage intensity and 
consequently monetization opportunities, matching diffusion and usage information with financial 
information on the revenue flows could indicate if the changes actually worked. Second, some of the 
applications studied have “in-built” network or peer effects, while others carry significant utility 
independent of the number of other users. Analyzing the usage and diffusion patterns of these 
groups might help assess the strength of word-of-mouth (which exist for all applications) and 
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network effects (which matter only to a subset of applications). Finally, our finding that users 
substitute applications by multi-application developers suggests that there may be limits to the size 
of a developer. Studying the size and growth dynamics of these developers could deliver insights into 
the role of “attention diseconomies” from the users’ point of view in the growth of firms.  
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Figures and tables 
 
Figure 1: Active Facebook user 
 
Figure 2: Overall number of Facebook application and their usage 
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Figure 3: Number of installations for three selected applications 
 
Figure 4: Percent of daily active users for three selected Facebook applications  
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  Usage intensity of an application measured as percentage of daily 
active users of 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡  [mn] Number of users that have installed an application 
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  Weeks since an application has first appeared in Facebook’s 
application directory 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  Average Herfindahl-Hirshman-Index of the two categories an 
application is assigned to 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  Herfindahl-Hirshman-Index of the market defined by the 
intersection of the two categories assigned to an application 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  Number of sister applications offered by the same developer 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡 [mn] Number of users that have installed a sister application by the same 
developer 
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡  Total number of updates of an application divided by 
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  
𝐶𝑕𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡  Christmas dummy (last two weeks of 2007 and first week of 2008) 
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  Dummy for the diffusion stage (zero before 𝜏 one thereafter) 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡  Dummy for the policy change (zero before sixth week of 2008 and 
one thereafter) 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  498403 3.947474 8.130413 0 100 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡  [mn] 498403 0.0695 0.780967 0 100.1983 
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  498403 16.9841 12.15892 0 58 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  498403 0.1595677 0.1280011 .0255039 .9118252 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  498403 0.2774588 0.24899 0 1 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  498403 19.48498 49.61799 0 287 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  498403 0.4162556 1.34609 0 31.61227 
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡  498403 0.7405133 0.9204854 .0892857 5 
𝐶𝑕𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡  498403 0.0598612 0.2372297 0 1 
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  498422 0.6753313 0.4682514 0 1 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡  498403 0.6399079 0.4800273 0 1 
 
Table 3: Logistic diffusion coefficients for three selected applications 
 𝛾 𝛽 𝜏 
Super Wall 35.29 0.10 2492 (2007w49) 
Are You Interested 9.35 0.19 2490 (2007w47) 
Entourage 6.23 0.30 2486 (2007w43) 
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Table 4: Baseline model for the usage intensity regression 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ln⁡(𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 1)  
INDEPENDENT (4) 
VARIABLES  
  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡  -0.0137*** 
 (0.00489) 
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  -0.0285*** 
 (0.000187) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  0.310*** 
 (0.0347) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  0.0368** 
 (0.0150) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  -0.00265*** 
 (0.000117) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  -0.0282*** 
 (0.00362) 
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡  0.486*** 
 (0.00196) 
𝐶𝑕𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡  -0.103*** 
 (0.00347) 
  
Constant 1.218*** 
 (0.00743) 
  
Observations 498403 
R² 0.707 
Number of Applications 18552 
Fixed-effect OLS regression, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Usage regression with 𝑫𝒊𝒇𝒇𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆 and 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒚𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 as interaction effects. The first main effects 
are reported in the first column, while interactions with of the respective variables with 𝑫𝒊𝒇𝒇𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆 and 
𝑷𝒐𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒚𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 are reported in column two and three. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ln⁡(𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 1) 
INDEPENDENT Base Interaction Interaction 
VARIABLES Coefficients * 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 * 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 
    
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡  0.00911 0.0149*** -0.0256*** 
 (0.00964) (0.00574) (0.00462) 
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  -0.0415*** 0.00143*** 0.0177*** 
 (0.000459) (0.000388) (0.000332) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  -0.127*** 0.132*** 0.213*** 
 (0.0422) (0.0350) (0.0296) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  -0.0127 0.00272 0.0689*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0184) (0.0154) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  -0.00167*** 6.16e-05 0.000131* 
 (0.000177) (9.17e-05) (6.92e-05) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  -0.00665 0.00280 -0.0129*** 
 (0.00520) (0.00400) (0.00309) 
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡  0.441*** 0.0410*** -0.0684*** 
 (0.00244) (0.00465) (0.00401) 
𝐶𝑕𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡  -0.135*** 0.0468***  
 (0.00536) (0.00657)  
    
Constant 1.601*** -0.221*** -0.331*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0101) (0.00880) 
    
Observations 498403 
0.724 
18552 
R² 
Number of Applications 
Fixed-effect OLS regression, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A. 1: Usage intensity regressions with 𝑫𝒊𝒇𝒇𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆 or 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒚𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 as moderating effects 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ln⁡(𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 1)  
 (A.3-1) (A.3-2) 
INDEPENDENT Base Interaction Base Interaction 
VARIABLES Coefficients * 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 Coefficients * 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 
     
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡  -0.0155** 0.0113* 0.00946 -0.0226*** 
 (0.00737) (0.00611) (0.00731) (0.00471) 
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  -0.0287*** 0.00286*** -0.0436*** 0.0197*** 
 (0.000390) (0.000420) (0.000350) (0.000323) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  0.143*** 0.261*** -0.0680* 0.238*** 
 (0.0432) (0.0359) (0.0365) (0.0290) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  0.0270 0.0243 -0.0154 0.0734*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0186) (0.0161) (0.0150) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  -0.00234*** -9.83e-05 -0.00166*** 0.000124* 
 (0.000164) (9.98e-05) (0.000153) (7.12e-05) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  -0.0219*** -0.00171 -0.00938** -0.0108*** 
 (0.00503) (0.00426) (0.00424) (0.00306) 
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡  0.449*** 0.0374*** 0.463*** -0.0550*** 
 (0.00238) (0.00479) (0.00224) (0.00390) 
𝐶𝑕𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡  -0.127*** 0.0399*** -0.107***  
 (0.00568) (0.00681) (0.00316)  
     
Constant 1.386*** -0.293*** 1.510*** -0.380*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.00918) (0.00844) 
     
Observations 498403 498403 
R² 0.711 0.722 
Number of Applications 18552 18552 
Fixed-effect OLS regression, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A. 2: Usage regression with 𝑫𝒊𝒇𝒇𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆 and 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒚𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 as moderating effects and three-way 
interactions 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ln⁡(𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 1) 
INDEPENDENT Base Interaction Interaction Interaction 
VARIABLES Coefficients * 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 * 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 * 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 
* 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 
     
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡  0.0127 0.00394 -0.0293*** 0.00878 
 (0.0158) (0.00955) (0.0113) (0.0104) 
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  -0.0454*** 0.00770*** 0.0185*** -0.00254*** 
 (0.000562) (0.000648) (0.000511) (0.000618) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  -0.131*** 0.180*** 0.324*** -0.166*** 
 (0.0444) (0.0420) (0.0493) (0.0551) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  -0.0109 -0.00334 0.0625** 0.0131 
 (0.0206) (0.0214) (0.0275) (0.0302) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  -0.00153*** -0.000208* -0.000332** 0.000667*** 
 (0.000189) (0.000120) (0.000136) (0.000142) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  -0.00500 -0.00110 -0.0133* 0.00166 
 (0.00645) (0.00528) (0.00698) (0.00712) 
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡  0.437*** 0.0585*** -0.0839*** -0.00639 
 (0.00257) (0.00633) (0.00483) (0.00895) 
𝐶𝑕𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡  -0.109*** -0.00144   
 (0.00537) (0.00649)   
     
Constant 1.606*** -0.235*** -0.246*** -0.0919*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0136) (0.0143) (0.0173) 
     
Observations 498403 
0.725 
18552 
R² 
Number of Applications 
Fixed-effect OLS regression, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A. 3: Robustness checks for usage intensity regressions. (A.5-1) repeats the results from the base-line 
model (4). In (A.5-2) all observations with zero usage intensity are taken out. (A.5-3) and (A.5-4) repeat (A.5-
1) and (A.5-2) with an untransformed (linear) dependent variable. Finally (A.5-5) reports results for a 
Poisson model. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  
INDEPENDENT (A.5-1) (A.5-2) (A.5-3) (A.5-4) (A.5-5) 
VARIABLES OLS 
DV: log 
with 0s 
OLS 
DV: log 
w/o 0s 
OLS 
DV: lin 
with 0s 
OLS 
DV: lin 
w/o 0s 
Poisson 
DV: lin 
with 0s 
      
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡  -0.0137*** -0.0370** -0.376** -1.250*** 0.0418*** 
 (0.00489) (0.0151) (0.187) (0.271) (0.0137) 
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  -0.0285*** -0.0267*** -0.00314** 0.00242 -0.0647*** 
 (0.000187) (0.000186) (0.00153) (0.00174) (0.000624) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  0.310*** 0.293*** 2.949*** 3.056*** 0.421*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0319) (0.326) (0.352) (0.0798) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  0.0368** 0.0367*** 0.406*** 0.402*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0140) (0.143) (0.156) (0.0356) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  -0.00265*** -0.00296*** -0.0225*** -0.0244*** -0.00208*** 
 (0.000117) (0.000100) (0.00184) (0.00190) (0.000240) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  -0.0282*** -0.0344*** -0.325*** -0.351*** -0.0401*** 
 (0.00362) (0.00442) (0.0333) (0.0398) (0.00918) 
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡  0.486*** 0.484*** 7.032*** 7.223*** 0.433*** 
 (0.00196) (0.00176) (0.0377) (0.0380) (0.00208) 
𝐶𝑕𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡  -0.103*** -0.120*** -0.795*** -0.855*** -0.119*** 
 (0.00347) (0.00335) (0.0414) (0.0428) (0.00873) 
Constant 1.218*** 1.311*** -1.143*** -1.059***  
 (0.00743) (0.00706) (0.0820) (0.0902)  
      
Observations 498403 429698 498403 429698 498332 
R² 0.707 0.737 0.650 0.664  
Number of Applications 18552 18552 18552 18552 18481 
Fixed-effect OLS/Poisson regression, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Appendix B (not intended for publication) 
 
 
 
Figure B. 1: Example for an application entry in the Facebook application directory 
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Figure B. 2: Histogram of the dependent variable 𝑼𝒔𝒂𝒈𝒆𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕 
 
Figure B. 3: Histogram of the transformed dependent variable 𝒍𝒏 𝑼𝒔𝒂𝒈𝒆𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕 + 𝟏  
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Table B. 1: Correlation Table 
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡  𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡  1.0000     
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  0.0872 1.0000    
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  0.0069 0.0481 1.0000   
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  0.0232 0.0130 0.6081 1.0000  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  -0.0242 0.0075 -0.0281 -0.1017 1.0000 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  0.1025 0.0921 -0.0744 -0.1358 0.4246 
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡  -0.0308 -0.5751 -0.0114 0.0058 -0.0435 
𝐶𝑕𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.0001 -0.1072 0.0131 0.0068 0.0022 
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  0.0127 0.1803 -0.0257 -0.0320 0.0510 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡  0.0006 0.3684 -0.0374 -0.0274 0.0229 
 
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠 
𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡  𝐶𝑕𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡       
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡       
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡       
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡       
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡       
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  1.0000     
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡  -0.0697 1.0000    
𝐶𝑕𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.0115 0.0394 1.0000   
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  0.0493 -0.2810 -0.0644 1.0000  
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑕𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡  0.0004 -0.2182 -0.3364 0.2853 1.0000 
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Table B. 2: Variance inflation factors for model (4) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  3.91 0.255531 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  3.51 0.285199 
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  1.96 0.511022 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  1.39 0.717508 
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡  1.38 0.723462 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡  1.38 0.723646 
𝐶𝑕𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡  1.05 0.947922 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡  1.03 0.969996 
Mean VIF 1.95  
 
